Defending Gibrat’s Law as a long-run regularity

According to Gibrat’s Law of Proportionate Effect, the growth rate of a given firm is independent of its size at the beginning of the period examined. While earlier studies tended to confirm the Law, more recent research generally rejects it. This article reconciles these two streams of literature, taking into account the role of market selection and learning in reshaping a given population of firms through time. Consistently with previous studies, we find that Gibrat’s Law has to be rejected ex ante, since smaller firms tend to grow faster than their larger counterparts. However, a significant convergence toward Gibrat-like behavior can be detected ex post. This finding is an indication that market selection “cleans” the original population of firms, so that the resulting industrial “core” does not depart from a Gibrat-like pattern of growth. From a theoretical point of view, this result is consistent with those models based on passive and active learning, and can be seen as a defense of the validity of the Law in the long-run.

商业银行风险管理模型的性质及启示

随着新资本协议的实施,各种估值定价和风险计量模型开始在我国商业银行大量应用。本文对商业银行风险管理模型的五大基本性质及其衍生性质进行了研究,并进一步给出了有效防范模型风险的若干建议。     

企业异质性与服务贸易保护水平的决定——基于中国数据的实证检验

笔者从政治经济学的分析视角,运用博弈论的分析方法,对企业异质性和服务贸易保护水平的相关性进行了理论分析,并结合中国服务部门的数据进行实证检验。结果表明:一个服务部门的产业集中度越高,劳动生产率越低,资本密集度越低,其贸易保护水平也越高。此外,中国所有制结构的特殊性赋予企业异质性更多的内涵,在一个服务部门内,国有企业的比重越大,贸易保护水平也越高。     

Corporate Demography and Empirical Industrial Organization: A Critical Appraisal

The emerging field of corporate demography views corporations and industries in a similar way to human or animal individuals and groups. In spite of a surprisingly large overlap of subject matter with economics, corporate demography is not well-known by, nor easily accessible to economists. An extremely useful recent book, The Demography of Corporations and Industries, by Glenn R. Carroll and Michael T. Hannan (2000) should change that. This review essay critically examines corporate demography from an economic viewpoint. The very different view of competition in corporate demography gets particular attention.     

零售企业扩张实践质疑威廉姆森命题

"复制和选择性干预不可能",是威廉姆森关于企业规模边界的一个颇具权威性的命题,但是本文认为,这个命题已遭到零售企业扩张实践的质疑,沃尔玛、家乐福等零售企业的扩张恰恰是由"复制和选择性干预"所支撑的.本文从零售企业"类似性活动"业务属性和"订购性生产"经营特征分析切入,对零售企业扩张中"复制和选择性干预"成为可能的深层原因进行了探讨.最后,文章认为,威廉姆森命题的遭遇与经济学的某种局限有关,这种局限的直接表现是经济学一直都将企业默认为生产企业,忽略流通企业的特殊属性,"工商合一"、"以工代商".文章对这种表象背后的原因也作了一定的分析.     

Cross-border mergers and acquisitions vs. greenfield foreign direct investment: The role of firm heterogeneity

We develop a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms to address two sets of questions: (1) what are the characteristics of firms that choose the various modes of foreign market access (exporting, greenfield FDI, and cross-border M&A), and (2) how does the international organization of production vary across industries and country-pairs? We show that the answers to these questions depend on the nature of firm heterogeneity. Depending on whether firms differ in their mobile or immobile capabilities, cross-border mergers involve the most or the least efficient active firms. The comparative statics on industry and country characteristics display a similar dichotomy.     

我国上市公司大股东与中小股东企业剩余分配不均衡的权力解读--兼论我国上市公司中小投资者利益保护机制

真实经济中存在大量的大股东利益侵占现象,本文认为,这是股东经济权力天然非对等的必然结果.本文从放松股东为同一性质主体假定和股东间非对等经济权力入手,建立企业剩余分配的博弈模型,推演出大股东侵占中小股东利益过程和实现机制,指出通过控制权实现利益侵占是市场失灵的必然结果,市场机制本身无法解决.     

企业差异化优势的构建组合及应用

本文以迈克尔·波特的差异化战略理论为基础，沿着市场景框和整体产品两个维度，探讨了差异化优势构建的组合，提出了应用差异化优势组合需要把握差异化“度”和持续性。     

The Innovative Performance Of The World'S Largest Firms: Some New Evidence ‡

Data on R & D expenditures and US patenting in the world's 660 largest, technologically active firms both show a linear relation between firm size and the volume of innovative activities, despite some inconsistencies between the two measures. Technological diversity increases with firm size, but relatively weakly, especially in R & D-intensive sectors. Sectoral variations in the comparative technological advantage of large firms based in Japan, the USA and W. Europe are better explained by variations in rivalry in their home market than by variations in their size.